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although seemingly a rejection
of the le loci delicti rule, does not
2
actually conflict with it. 6
It is felt that the holding in the Heinemann case should be limited to the specific fact-situation there involved, and not be considered
a leading authority in the general area of the applicability of the
lex loci delicti rule. It is submitted that the principal case states the
correct law on this point and clarifies the New York position. Hence,
the Kaufman case should be the controlling New York case in situations calling for the application of the lex loci delicti rule to cases
involving charitable immunity from tort liability.

TAXATION-DEDUCTION OF FINES AND PENALTIES HELD NOT
PROPER BECAUSE FRUSTRATIVE OF STATE POLICIES. - Taxpayer

sought to deduct as ordinary and necessary expenses 1 fines paid for
violations of a Pennsylvania statute 2 prescribing maximum truck
weights. It was commercially impracticable for taxpayer to comply
with the statute. The Tax Court disallowed the deduction on the
ground that it would frustrate sharply-defined state policy. The Court
of Appeals affirmed. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court
held that allowing deduction of fines and penalties would frustrate
state policies by mitigating their deterrent effect. Tank Truck
Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
In a companion case, the Court affirmed an order of the Court
of Appeals reversing a Tax Court determination that amounts expended by a bookmaker for rent and salaries were not deductible
since made in connection with illegal acts. The Court held that since
gambling is recognized as a business for federal tax purposes, taxpayer's normal operating expenses are deductible.8 Commissioner v.
Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
26 See note 18 supra.
: The former version of § 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
provided that in computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the
taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered;
. . and rentals or other payments required to be made as a condition to the
continued use or possession, for purposes of the trade or business, of property
to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which he has
no equity." 56 STAT. 819 (1942).
2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 453 (1953), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
75, § 453 (Supp. 1957).
3 The Court distinguishes Tank Truck Rentals, stating that a deduction is
permitted unless the allowance would avoid the consequence of violations of the

law.

Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 29 (1958).
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Frustration of public policy as a ground for disallowing an expenditure sought to be deducted as an ordinary and necessary business expense is a judicially-imposed limitation upon the statute. 4 In
one of the first of such cases treated by the Supreme Court, Textile
lMills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner,5 lobbying expenses were disallowed. It was noted that "contracts to spread such insidious
influences ... have long been condemned" 6 and asserted that a line
may be drawn ". . . between legitimate business expenses and those

arising from that family of contracts to which the law has given no
sanction. The exclusion of the latter from 'ordinary and necessary'
expenses does no violence to statutory language." 7 Two years later,
in 1943, the Court observed that the former version of section 162
had been judicially narrowed in order that the tax deduction might
not frustrate national or state policies. 8 The Court did not consider
this particular problem again until 1952. In Lilly v. Commissioner,9
the deduction of a kickback by an optometrist, disallowed in the lower
courts on the ground that payments were contrary to public policy,
was allowed as an ordinary and necessary business expense by the
Supreme Court. 10 The public policy limitation was thus delimited:
[We assume that] .. . business expenses which are ordinary and necessary in

the generally accepted meanings of those words may not be deductible as
"ordinary and necessary" expenses under [the former version of section 162]
. . . when they "frustrate sharply defined national or state policies proscribing
particular types of conduct. . . ." The policies frustrated must be national or
state policies evidenced by some governmental declaration of them. 1 '

Many problems arose in the application of the policy expressed
by Lilly. The Court's statement of the public policy limitation was
4 See Note, 51 COLUm. L. REv. 752 (1951); Comment, 41 MARQ. L. Ray.
305 (1958). For a criticism of this limitation see Reid, Disallowance of Tax
Deductions on Grounds of Public Polic,--A Critique, 17 FED. B.J. 575 (1957)
(hereinafter referred to as Reid, Disallowance of Deductions). Mr. Reid considers that "moral turpitude is a very poor criterion for taxability... ." Id. at
578. He advises adherence to the letter of the Internal Revenue Code. Id.
at 578-83.
5314 U.S. 326 (1941).
6 Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 338 (1941).
7 Id. at 339.
8 Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 473 (1943) (legal expenses to
defend mail fraud order held deductible).
9343 U.S. 90 (1952).
20 Under other circumstances, kickbacks were held not "necessary" expenses.
Harden Mortgage Loan Co. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 282 (10th Cir. 1943).
In Lilly, taxpayer proved the kickbacks essential to his business and ordinary
in the locality in which he practiced his profession.
"1Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1952). See also Reid, Disallowance of Deductions, 17 FED. B.J. 575, 576 (1957) ; Comment, 41 MARQ. L.
REv. 305, 309 (1958).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. ;33

dictum. 12 Likewise, as the Court seemed to be pulling back from its
position in Textile Mills, doubt was cast upon the extent to which it
intended to adhere to this policy in the future. 13 The Seventh Circuit,
in Doyle v. Commissioner,'4 disregarded the limitation.'9 It felt that
the application of the policy would, in effect, add a separate limitation
to the statute.16 Refusing to thus add to the statute, the court considered only whether the expense was economically integrated with
7
the business and met the "ordinary and necessary" requirements.1
The principal cases state unequivocally that where a deduction
would frustrate national or state policies, the deduction must be disallowed.' 8 Thus the Court rejects the rule of the Doyle case.' 9 The
Court indicates that it does not feel that its holding adds a limitation
to the statute, but rather that the finding of frustration of public policy
precludes a finding of "necessity." 20
12 "Ass ming . . . [such expenses] nmy not be deductible."
Lilly v. Commissioner, supra note 11, at 96. (Emphasis added.) See Reid, supra note 11,
at 582; Comment, 41 MARQ. L. REv. 305-06 (1958).
13 See Reid, Disallowance of Deductions, supra note 11, at 582.
14231 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1956).
15 The court allowed deduction of a bookmaker's expenses for rent and salaries in face of the Commissioner's contention that the expenses were unlawful.
"From [the former version of section 162] . . . we find that an allowable
deduction . . . must be ordinary and necessary, nothing more or less .... We
construe the statutory words 'ordinary and necessary' expenses to mean those
expenses which economically are an integral part of a business, whether it be
lawful or unlawful." Doyle v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 635, 637 (7th Cir. 1956).
In reversing the Tax Court's disallowance of deductions in Sullivan v.
Commissioner, the Circuit Court emphasized: "We made it clear, [in the
Doyle case] . . . that [the former version of section 162], . . . in setting
forth what trade or business expenses are to be deducted from gross income
in computing net income, makes no distinction between lawful and vnlawful
disbursements." Sullivan v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 46, 47 (7th Cir. 1957),
aff'd, 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
See also Comment, 41 MARQ. L. REv. 305, 308

(1958).
16"[T]he Commissioner would include the element of lawfulness of expenses . . . as a requirement or [sic] their deductibility, in addition to the act's
requirement that said expenses be 'ordinary and necessary' . . . . [He] . . .
would have us add the word 'lawful' in the guise of judicial construction."
Doyle v. Commissioner, supra note 15, at 636. (Emphasis added.) The court
distinguished the bribe, penalty and lobbying cases on the ground that they
were not an integral part of the business. Id. at 637.
17 See note 15, supra.
18 "A finding of 'necessity'
cannot be made, however, if allowance of the
deduction would frustrate sharply defined national or state policies ... "
Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 33 (1958) (emphasis
added). The Court cites Lilly and Heininger for support. In those cases, reference to the frustration "rule" was dicta. See notes 8 and 12, supra.
19 Whereas Doyle would ignore lawfulness (see note 15, supra), the Court
here makes it clear that lawfulness of the disbursement must be considered.
Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, note 18, supra.
20 See note 18, sufpra.
The question remains, however, what illegality has
to do with necessity. In Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940), Mr. Justice
Douglas stated that ". . . ordinary and necessary is to be construed according
to . . . popular or received import of the words. . . . Ordinary has the conno-
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The public policy requiring this limitation on the deductibility
21
of expenses must be evidenced by some governmental declaration.
Just what type of governmental declaration suffices is unclear. The
term certainly denotes federal or state statutes, and has been held to
include a local ordinance. 22 Court decisions are probably within its
scope.2 3 In one instance, the determination of an administrator of
the Office of Price Administration was effective to define public
policy.2 4 Considerations of professional ethics and general morality
were excluded by the Lilly case.25 Finding it unnecessary to clarify
this question
in the principal cases, the Court expressly leaves it
26
open.

Just when an expense will frustrate public policy is not at all
clear from the court decisions. 27 Where an expense is itself proscribed by statute, it will be disallowed. 28 The principal cases deal
tation of normal, usual or customary." Id. at 493. Necessary is defined in
Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933) (cited with approval in DuPont),
as ".

.

. appropriate and helpful."

The construction in Lilly was similarly

broad. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 93 (1951).
21 Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra note 18, at 33-34; Lilly
v. Commissioner, supra note 20, at 97.
22 See, e.g., Automatic Cigarette Sales Corp. v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 825
(4th Cir. 1956) (violation of state statute and city ordinance); William F.
Davis, Jr., 17 T.C. 549 (1951) (violation of Securities Exchange Act of 1934)
Harry Wiedetz, 2 T.C. 1262 (1943) (violation of city ordinance).
23 See Textile Mills See. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 338 (1941)
(cited in Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 95 (1952)), where lobbying expenses condemned by the courts, not by statute, were disallowed. See also
Comment, 41 MARQ. L. Rv. 305, 308 (1958).
24 Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949). In
considering whether a deduction of a penalty paid for violation of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 would frustrate public policy, the court,
holding that it would not, stated: "[W]e have the answer from the best possible source-the Administrator himself." Id. at 714.
Prior to 1944, § 205 of the act did not distinguish between the willful and non-willful violator. The Administrator, however, construed the statute
so as to give him discretion not to sue for treble damages in the case of innocent violators, and in those cases demanded payment of the amount of overcharge only. In 1944, Congress amended the act so as to expressly give the
Administrator such power. Ibid. "[Wlhere the Administrator accepted the
amount of the overcharge as sufficient, it did not 'frustrate' any 'sharply
defined' policies of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942." Ibid.
25 Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 97 (1952).
But see Estate of Joseph
Karger, 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 637 (1954).
26 Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30. 34 n.6 (1958).
"Because state policy in this case was evidenced by specific legislation, it is
unnecessary to decide whether the requisite 'governmental declaration' might
exist other than in an Act of the Legislature." Ibid.
27 See Reid, Disallowanceof Deductions, 17 FED. B.J. 575-79 (1957).
I
1...
defy anyone to construct a legal theory ... which would reconcile the various
decisions on the deductibility of costs incurred by illegal enterprises and illegal
or immoral payments made by other businesses." Id. at 579.
28 See Boyle, Flagg & Seaman, Inc., 25 T.C. 43, 49-50 (1955), disapproving
deduction of certain proscribed commissions paid by insurance broker and cited
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with expenses not illegal in themselves but, in Tank Truck Rentals,
incurred as a consequence of an illegal act, and, in Sullivan, in the
operation of an illegal business.
Expenses incurred in consequence of an illegal act, such as fines
imposed for violation of a statute 2 9 or legal fees to defend certain
criminal prosecutions,"0 are not deductible. Deduction of such expenses would frustrate public policy by mitigating the deterrent effect
of the statute. In the Tank Truck Rentals case, the Court reaffirms
this policy.3 1
In the fine or penalty area, Jerry Rossnun Corp. v. Coninissioner3 2 allowed deduction of a fine to a non-willful violator of regulations of the Office of Price Administration. In that case, the OPA
Administrator demanded payment of the amount of overcharge only
and did not sue for treble damages as authorized by statute. The
court argued that the fine was not intended as a deterrent, but only
to prevent the violator from profiting by the violation. Thus, even
assuming that the exaction was a penalty, allowing the deduction
would not mitigate the deterrent effect of the statute.3 3 In Tank
Truck Rentals, the Court refuses to differentiate between the willful
and non-willful violation, there being no distinction made by the state
statute. 34 The implication is that the Court will not look behind the
statute to discover whether the statutory fine is punitive or remedial.3 5
Expenses supportive of an illegal business have been variously
allowed and disallowed. Generally, normal operating expenses such
with approval in the principal case. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, spra note 26, at 35. See also Comment, 41 MARQ. L. REv. 305, 307
(1958).
29 See cases cited note 22, supra.
30 See, e.g., Helvering v. Superior Wines & Liquors, Inc., 134 F.2d 373 (8th
Cir. 1943); National Outdoor Advertising Bureau, Inc. v. Helvering, 89 F.2d
878, 880-81 (2d Cir. 1937) (dictum).
31Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 35 (1958).
32 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949).
33Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711, 712-14 (2d Cir.

1949). See discussion note 24, supra. But see Note, 51 COLUm. L. REv. 752,
754 (1951). For a discussion of the Rossman case and its possible implications, see Gelfand, Payments to OPA, 27 TAXES 961 (1949).
34 Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra note 31, at 36. "[S]ince
• . . statutes make no distinction between innocent and willful violators, state
policy is as much thwarted in the one instance as in the other." Referring to
the petitioner's reliance on the Rossman case, the Court observes that ". . . the
Administrator, in applying the Act, had differentiated between willful and
innocent violators. No such differentiation exists here. ..
" Id. at 37.
35 Although the statute [PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §§453-55 (1953)
as
amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 453 (Supp. 1957)
authorized a single
trip ticket by an overweight trucker, although police never enforced removal
of excess weight, and although the fines were devoted to road repairs within
the municipality where the trucker was apprehended, the Court considered only
the fact- that the penalty was imposed by the statute as a penal measure.
Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 36 (1958).
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as rents and salaries are allowed. 36 The Tax Court, however, disallowed expenses of an abortionist in purchasing medical supplies and
paying fees to persons who recommended patients to him.37 In allowing deduction of operating expenses to the bookmaker in the Sullivan
case, the Court states that where a business is a business for federal
tax purpbses, the otherwise normal expenses it incurs will be
allowed. 38 The question remains, however, just when a business is
31 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Doyle, 231 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1956) (salaries
and rent of bookmaker) ; G. A. Comeaux, 10 T.C. 201 (1948), aff'd sub nora.,
Cohen v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1949) (expenses of illegal
gambling and liquor establishments). In the Cohen case, supra, the court
stated broadly, "legitimate expenses incurred in an illegitimate business are
deductible. . . ." Cohen v. Commissioner, supra, at 400.
Where the Tax Court found that the salaries and rent of the bookmaker
were, by statute, illegal in themselves [ILL. RE v. STAr. c. 38, § 336 (1945)]
the deduction was disallowed. Sam Mesi, 25 T.C. 513 (1955). The same
statute was involved in Commissioner v. Doyle and Commissioner v. Sullivan.
In Doyle, the Commissioner contended that the taxpayer, in paying rent, was
an accessory to the landlord's crime of knowingly permitting his property to
be used for gambling. The Seventh Circuit rejected this theory on the ground
that the guilt of the landlord could not be determined in an action in which
he was not a party. Hence the accessory's guilt must also fail of proof.
Commissioner v. Doyle, supra, at 638. In Sudllvan, as in Mesi, supra, the Tax
Court accepted the Commissioner's contention. The circuit court reversed the
Tax Court in Sullivan on the basis of the Doyle decision. Sullivan v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 46 (7th Cir. 1957), aff'd, 356 U.S. 27 (1958). Presumably,
Mesi is no longer the law.
37 Estate of Joseph Karger, 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 637 (1954). The Tax
Court's holding here is consistent with its position in Mesi v. Commissioner
and Sullivan v. Commissioner, supra note 36. Query: has the Supreme Court
in affirming the reversal in the Sullivan case affected the Karger case? Perhaps
the cases are to be distinguished by the nature of the crime involved. Note
the Tax Court's language in Karger: "In the long category of crimes, few,
if any, are considered more reprehensible or revolting to common decency and
good public morals. . . . Decedent's activity was of such a leprous character
that it contaminated all who touched it. The fees in question were paid by
one participant in a crime to an accomplice. . . . Such deductions cannot be
allowed. . . . As to medical supplies, . . . they constituted the tools for decedent's illegal and criminal business. These items cannot be allowed as being
contrary to well defined public policy." Id. at 640.
In Textile Mills, the expense was disallowed as it was consideration for a
contract to perform illegal services. Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner,
314 U.S. 326, 338-40 (1941). Likewise, a medical deduction is not allowed
to the patient of an abortion. U.S. TREAS. REG. § 1.213-1(e) (1)ii. ["Medical
care" is, however, specifically defined so as to exclude, apparently, an operation
of this type. INT. REv. CODE Oi 1954 § 213(e) (1) (A).] A taxpayer was also
denied a dependent's deduction for a married undivorced woman with whom
he was living in adulterous cohabitation in violation of public morals and the
laws of Alabama. Leon Turnipseed, 27 T.C. 759 (1957). [The public policy
limitation expressed in Turnipseed was subsequently codified in U.S. TREAs.
REG;. § 1.152-1(b).] If the distinction is to be based on the shocking nature of
the crime, not only does the problem of line drawing arise, but of line drawing
based on the moral sensibilities of a judge. See Reid, Disallowance of Deductions, 17 FED. B.J. 575, 578 (1957).
38 Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
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".. . a business for federal tax purposes." 39 The criterion here used,
the imposition of a federal excise tax upon gambling, seems not to be
exclusive. 40 Query: what other criteria may be used ? 41
In Sullivan, the Court seems to disregard the finding of the Tax
Court that the bookmaker's expenses were themselves illegal by Illinois statute. 42 The Court may not overturn a finding of fact without
a clear showing that it was erroneous. 43 If the Court is holding that,
albeit their illegality, the expenses are deductible, it is inconsistent

with its own statement of the law in Tank Truck Rentals.44 It can
be argued that the finding of the Tax Court was not of fact but was
a statutory construction. Yet it is surprising that the Court neither
alludes to this finding in its opinion nor construes the statute itself.
The reluctance of the Court, evidenced by Tank Truck Rentals, 45
to look behind the statute to determine whether a "penalty" is in fact
punitive or remedial or whether the allowance of a deduction to a
non-willful violator will actually frustrate state policy seems overly
strict. A better rule would be to determine in each case whether the
statute is intended as an absolute prohibition or merely gives an option
to comply or pay damages and, if an absolute proscription, whether
allowing
deduction of a penalty will actually mitigate its deterrent
46
effect.

39 Id. at 29.
40 "Regulations . . . make the federal excise tax on wagers deductible as
an ordinary and necessary business expense. This seems to us to be a recognition of a gambling enterprise as a business for federal tax purposes." Commissioner v. Sullivan, supra note 38, at 28-29. This language does not connote
an exclusive rule.
41 If the mere imposition of a federal income tax is sufficient as a criterion,
then, presumably, the abortionist, arsonist, dope smuggler, etc., may deduct
their operating expenses. Such a result would be absurd.
42 Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27-28 (1958).
The statute here involved [ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38, § 336 (1945)] was discussed in note 36, supra.
In reversing the Tax Court, the Seventh Circuit did not reverse its finding
of illegality, but held only that the lawfulness of the disbursement made no
difference. Sullivan v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 46, 47 (7th Cir. 1957), aff'd,
356 U.S. 27 (1958). This argument is, of course, no longer applicable. Tank
Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
43 Review is limited by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: "Findings
"
F. R. CIv. P.
of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous ...
52(a).
44 Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra note 42, at 35. "[Fjrustration of state policy is most complete and direct when the expenditure . . .
is itself prohibited by statute." Ibid.
45 See discussion in notes 24 and 34 supra.
46 See Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711, 714 (2d Cir.
1949): "[ihere are 'penalties' and 'penalties' . . . some are deductible and
[T]here is no more ground for taking as a 'rigid criterion'
some are not....
the imposition of a fine than the incurrence of expenses [referring to the legal
expenses in Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943)]. Each may
'frustrate .

.

. policies' . . . ; that will depend on how one views the deterrent

effect. We hold therefore that in every case the question must be decided
ad hoc." See also Comment, 41 MARQ. L. REv. 305, 307 (1958).
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While the principal cases firmly fix the public policy limitation
in the tax law, they do little to clarify its application. This is especially true with regard to the operating expenses of an illegal business:
just how far the Sullivan rule will be applied to other illegal businesses
is unclear.

M
TAXATIoN -

FEDERAL TAX LIENS

-

SURETY'S RIGHT HELD

return for a surety's execution of a performance bond that guaranteed completion of subcontracting work on a Texas housing project, the subcontractor assigned
to the surety all sums due or to become due from the general contractor under the subcontract. These sums were to serve as collateral security not only for losses incurred on the housing project
but for any other indebtedness or liability the subcontractor might
incur to the surety "whether heretofore or hereafter incurred." Subsequent to this assignment, the surety executed for the subcontractor
a second bond covering another job in Kentucky. Then, in sequence,
the Texas work was completed and the subcontractor became entitled
to the sums held by the general contractor, no payment being actually
made: the federal government filed tax liens against the subcontractor;
and finally, the surety was forced to perform under the Kentucky
bond because of the subcontractor's default. In an interpleader action to determine whether the federal government or the surety had
the right to the retained percentages still due on the Texas project.
the lower courts 1 held that the surety was a mortgagee under the
provisions of section 3672(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
and therefore its rights took precedence over the government's tax
lien. The Supreme Court, per curiam with four iustices dissenting,
reversed, holding that the tax lien took precedence because the instrument creating the surety's right was "inchoate and unnerfected."
United States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958).
A federal tax lien arises when any person liable to pay any federal tax neglects or refuses to nay the tax after a demand, and it
attaches to all property and rights to nroperty owned by the delinquent taxpayer.2 In most cases the lien is a secret charge against
the property, known only to the taxpayer and the Internal Revenue
Service, for it arises at the time the tax assessment is made 3 by the
District Director of Internal Revenue, 4 whose records are not open
INFERIOR TO FEDERAL TAX LIENS.-In

I United States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 140 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. Tex.),
aff'd per curiam, 239 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1956).
2 IxT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6321.
3 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6322.

4 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6203; Treas. Reg. 301.6201-1 (1954).

